OVERVIEW
1. The United Kingdom faces a continuing threat from extremists who believe they can advance
their aims by committing acts of terrorism here in the UK and against our citizens and interests
abroad. To combat this threat the Government has developed a counter-terrorism strategy and
set up programmes and plans to give effect to it. This document describes that strategy and
explains what organisations and individuals can do to help in its implementation.
2. Since our counter-terrorist strategy comprises both open elements (which can be freely
publicised and discussed) and classified elements (which are kept secret), this paper gives only
a partial account of the strategy and omits those secret aspects.
THE THREAT
3. Terrorism is not a new phenomenon: for example, the UK experienced repeated domestic
terrorist attacks as a result of the long-running troubles in Northern Ireland. The principal
current terrorist threat is from radicalised individuals who are using a distorted and
unrepresentative version of the Islamic faith to justify violence. Such people are referred to in
this paper as Islamist terrorists. They are, however, a tiny minority within the Muslim
communities here and abroad. Muslim communities themselves do not threaten our security;
indeed they make a great contribution to our country. The Government is therefore working in
partnership with Muslim communities to help them prevent extremists gaining influence there.
4. The current threat from Islamist terrorism is serious and sustained. It is genuinely
international in scope, involving a variety of groups, networks and individuals who are driven
by particular violent and extremist beliefs. It is indiscriminate – aiming to cause mass
casualties, regardless of the age, nationality, or religion of their victims; and the terrorists are
often prepared to commit suicide to kill others. Overall, we judge that the scale of the threat is
potentially still increasing and is not likely to diminish significantly for some years.
THE RESPONSE
5. Since early 2003, the United Kingdom has had a long-term strategy for countering
international terrorism (known within Government as CONTEST). Its aim is to reduce the risk
from international terrorism, so that people can go about their daily lives freely and with
confidence. The strategy is divided into four principal strands: PREVENT, PURSUE,
PROTECT, and PREPARE.
Preventing terrorism by tackling the radicalisation of individuals
6. The PREVENT strand is concerned with tackling the radicalisation of individuals. We seek
to do this by:
 Tackling disadvantage and supporting reform – addressing structural problems in the
UK and overseas that may contribute to radicalisation, such as inequalities and
discrimination;
 Deterring those who facilitate terrorism and those who encourage others to become
terrorists – changing the environment in which the extremists and those radicalising
others can operate; and
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 Engaging in the battle of ideas – challenging the ideologies that extremists believe can
justify the use of violence, primarily by helping Muslims who wish to dispute these
ideas to do so.
Pursuing terrorists and those that sponsor them
7. The PURSUE strand is concerned with reducing the terrorist threat to the UK and to UK
interests overseas by disrupting terrorists and their operations. It has a number of aspects:
 Gathering intelligence – improving our ability to identify and understand the terrorist
threat;
 Disrupting terrorist activity – taking action to frustrate terrorist attacks and to bring
terrorists to justice through prosecution and other means, including strengthening the
legal framework against terrorism, e.g. by introducing legislation to deport those who
are judged to be not conducive to the public good; and
 International co-operation – working with partners and allies overseas to strengthen our
intelligence effort and achieve disruption of terrorists outside the UK.
Protecting the public, key national services, and UK interests overseas
8. The PROTECT strand is concerned with reducing the vulnerability of the UK and UK
interests overseas. This covers a range of issues including;
 Strengthening border security – so that terrorists and those who inspire them can be
prevented from travelling here and we can get better intelligence about suspects who
travel, including improving our identity management, for example by use of biometrics;
 Protecting key utilities – working with the private sector;
 Transport – reducing the risk and impact of attacks through security and technological
advances; and
 Crowded places – protecting people going about their daily lives.
Preparing for the consequences
9. The PREPARE strand is concerned with ensuring that the UK is as ready as it can be for the
consequences of a terrorist attack. The key elements are:
 Identifying the potential risks the UK faces from terrorism and assessing their impact;
 Building the necessary capabilities to respond to any attacks; and
 Continually evaluating and testing our preparedness – e.g. by frequently exercising to
improve our response to incidents and learning lessons from incidents that do take
place.
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RESPONDING TO A DEVELOPING THREAT
10. Within this framework, as this paper describes, a great deal of work has been done since
2003 to develop and implement plans and programmes to strengthen counter-terrorism
capabilities at all levels of Government, the emergency services, business and the wider
community. Parliament has legislated to support this effort. Terrorist activity has been
disrupted, including through a number of successful prosecutions in the courts.
11. While good progress has been made, at the same time the threat has grown and it has
changed in character. It has both domestic and international dimensions. The terrorist attacks
in London on 7 July 2005 brought home the risk of suicide attacks by British citizens.
Following those attacks, the Government has worked with others to step up and deepen the
counter-terrorism effort.
12. The Prime Minister set out a twelve point action plan on 5 August 2005 principally focused
on strengthening powers to tackle those committed to facilitating and promoting terrorism and
on strengthening community integration. A widespread consultation exercise was launched
with the Muslim community. Other steps have been taken to accelerate the development of
counter-terrorism capability.
13. This paper identifies the range of issues which need to be addressed in implementing an
effective counter-terrorism policy against the type of threat we now face. It shows the breadth
of the challenge under each of the principal strands. Each needs a consistent and effective
implementation effort involving a number of partners, which the Government is working
actively to achieve. In addressing the challenge, the Government is clear that particular focus
and effort is needed in the PREVENT strand. The Government has an important role to play
here. Ultimately, however, this is a battle of ideas in which success will depend upon all parts
of the community challenging the ideological motivations used to justify the use of violence.
Providing the necessary resources
14. Additional resources have been made available both to respond to terrorist events - for
example, £775m was made available following the 9/11 attacks – and in support of the delivery
of the counter-terrorism strategy, including increasing the funding and capacity of our security
and intelligence services and the police. By 2008, annual spending on counter-terrorism,
intelligence, and resilience will reach £2bn, which is double what it was prior to 9/11.
Working together
15. Developing and delivering this counter-terrorism strategy involves all parts of Government
acting together and taking a joined-up approach to dealing with this complex and wide-ranging
threat. Delivery also depends upon partnerships with the police and emergency services, local
authorities, and devolved administrations, as well as with the private sector and the voluntary
and charitable sector.
16. Perhaps the most important of all these partnerships is between these bodies, led by the
Government, and our citizens and communities. Public awareness of the threat, understanding
of the measures needed to combat it, and active support and cooperation with the police are
critical to the success of the strategy.
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17. We also share a common interest with many other countries in combating terrorism, so
work with other governments and through international organisations is an important part of
protecting the UK and its interests.
18. The threat is real: this paper explains how we can all work together to understand and tackle
it successfully.
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COUNTERING INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM:
THE UNITED KINGDOM’S STRATEGY
19. The United Kingdom faces a continuing threat from extremists who believe they can
advance their aims by committing acts of terrorism here in the UK and against our citizens and
interests abroad. This paper summarises the Government’s strategy for countering that threat.
INTRODUCTION
20. Terrorism is a difficult and complex problem and our response to it is wide-ranging and
comprehensive. To help the public understand this issue better, we are setting out in this paper
an explanation both of the threat that we face and what we are doing to deal with it.
21. In doing so, we will look at the action being taken to prevent the radicalisation which can
lead to terrorism, action to pursue terrorists and those who sponsor them, as well as what is
being done to protect the public and deal with terrorist incidents. At intervals there are boxes
of text giving more information about specific issues or examples of specific actions that have
been taken in order to deliver our counter-terrorism strategy. (These actions are a selection from
the full range of current counter-terrorist activities, not all of which could be included here.)
The paper also looks at the issues of risk, the likelihood that a terrorist incident will happen and
the potential severity of its impact, and of vulnerability, the susceptibility to a particular type
of attack.
22. Our strategy for dealing with terrorism has evolved over many years in the light of
experience. For example, it incorporates the lessons from dealing with Irish terrorism over
some 30 years. It was renewed following the 9/11 attacks in the USA, when the aim and
framework described below were developed and increased resources for countering terrorism
were agreed, and it was looked at again following the 7 July 2005 attacks. The range of policies,
plans, and programmes described below will continue to be developed as necessary in future.
23. Terrorism is an international phenomenon which takes many forms. The Government’s
strategy is informed by, and has informed, the counter-terrorism strategies of a number of other
countries, with whom the UK has close links and a wide range of co-operation.
24. Our strategy comprises both open elements, which can be freely publicised and discussed,
and classified elements, which are kept secret. There have to be such secret elements, in order
to avoid alerting the terrorists themselves either to capabilities we possess for countering their
purposes or to vulnerabilities which they could exploit. Consequently, although we have tried
to explain as much to the public as we safely can, this paper gives only a partial account of our
counter-terrorist strategy and omits those aspects which have to be kept secret.
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THE THREAT
25. The Government keeps under review the range of potential terrorist threats that may arise
in the United Kingdom and to our citizens and interests overseas. The principal terrorist threat
is currently from radicalised individuals who are using a distorted and unrepresentative
interpretation of the Islamic faith to justify violence. Such people are referred to here as
Islamist terrorists1. This paper focuses on that threat and on the responses to it.
26. In any response to this threat, it is important to recognise that terrorists using these distorted
readings of Islam are a tiny minority within Muslim communities. Muslim communities
themselves do not threaten our security – in fact, we rely on the huge contribution they make
to the economic, cultural, and social life of the UK. Muslims are as much at risk from terrorism
as anyone else, as was shown by those who were killed or injured in the attacks on 7 July 2005.
But Muslims themselves are aware of the risk of radicalisation within certain offshoots of their
communities and we must work in partnership with communities to identify and respond to the
risks that extremism poses.
Recent terrorist activity
27. During the 1990s Islamist terrorist groups carried out numerous attacks in a variety of
countries. A bomb attack against the World Trade Center in New York in 1993 and the Paris
Metro attacks in 1995 were amongst the earliest of these, but later in the decade many more
attacks were made in other countries, including in Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Tanzania and Kenya, and
Yemen.
28. In the event, the most serious of these attacks came in September 2001, when four
simultaneous actions in the eastern USA killed nearly 3,000 people, including 67 British
citizens, making it the worst terrorist incident of modern times.
29. Since then, there have been further significant attacks: in predominantly Muslim countries
such as Pakistan, Tunisia, Morocco, Qatar, Jordan, Indonesia – including the bombing of a
nightclub in Bali in October 2002, in which over 190 people were killed, including 28 British
citizens – and Turkey; in India; as well as more attacks in Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen. There
have also been significant attacks in Europe: multiple attacks on the Madrid train network in
March 2004 and attacks in the United Kingdom in July 2005, when nearly simultaneous
explosions on the Underground network and a bus in London killed 52 innocent people and
injured over 700 others.
30. Many intended terrorist actions in this period, however, were disrupted or unsuccessful.
These are discussed further below.
Characteristics
31. Terrorism is not a new phenomenon. For example, the UK experienced repeated domestic
terrorist attacks as a result of the long-running troubles in Northern Ireland. Nevertheless, the
threat that we currently face does have certain distinctive characteristics.
1 The majority of groups usually referred to as Islamists are not terrorists. Islamism is a term with no universally agreed
definition, but which is usually used to suggest that a particular group or movement is seeking to build political structures it
deems Islamic.
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32. First, the threat is genuinely international. Compared with earlier terrorist threats, attacks
have been carried out, or attempted, against a very wide range of targets in many countries.
Sometimes these attacks are carried out by individuals from the country concerned and
sometimes by outsiders, so the domestic and international dimensions of this threat are closely
interlinked. The terrorists also make maximum use of the freedoms and possibilities of modern
life – especially the ease of travel and the ease with which information and money flows across
the world.
33. Second, the threat comes from a variety of groups, networks and individuals. These range
from larger groups organised around clear hierarchic and bureaucratic structures, to much
looser and smaller groups of like-minded individuals. These different elements often cooperate
and assist each other, but often also pursue separate goals.
34. In the past, terrorists have sometimes sought protection or sponsorship from states, as was
provided in the 1990s in Sudan and under the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. They continue to
seek out places where governments and security forces are weak as ‘havens’ for training and
other activities. These terrorists are, however, essentially non-state actors – they do not need
state support to operate.
35. Third, these terrorists intend to cause mass casualties. They are indiscriminate: aiming to
cause the most death and destruction that they can, regardless of the age, nationality, or religion
of their victims. Whilst they do aim at governmental targets, such as embassies and units of the
armed forces, or those with symbolic value, such as the twin towers of the World Trade Center
in New York, one distinctive feature of their attacks is that these often deliberately strike at
ordinary people going about their lives. Other terrorist groups have done this in the past, but
not on such a scale.
36. And these terrorists are often prepared to kill themselves as a means of killing many others.
This is not unique to these groups, but it has not been a feature of previous threats that the UK
has faced.
37. Fourth, the people involved in these terrorist attacks are driven by particular violent and
extremist beliefs. A common thread connecting many of the planned or successful terrorist
attacks in the UK, the rest of Europe, the Middle East, South Asia, and North America over the
past decade has been that those involved have claimed to be acting in defence of Islam.
However, the great majority of Muslims in the UK and abroad reject both extremism and
violence. What the terrorists in fact draw on is a particular and distorted form of Islam,
sometimes referred to as Islamist extremism, which they say encourages or obliges its
adherents to carry out acts of violence against those that they identify as their enemies.
What do the terrorists say?
The individuals who have carried out terrorist attacks which they claim are in defence of Islam do not in fact
adhere to a single set of beliefs: they may appear to outsiders to hold similar views, but can nevertheless have
quite distinct opinions and approaches on particular issues. Overall, however, it is possible to identify certain
common themes.
First, the terrorists adopt a particular and malignant misinterpretation of Islamic teaching which they believe
places an obligation on believers to fight and explicitly to kill to achieve their aims. This interpretation, which
they believe legitimises their terrorist acts, is sometimes referred to as Jihadism2. It is not accepted by most
Muslims.
2 The term “jihad” refers primarily to non-violent struggle, for example the spiritual struggle to lead a good life. It may also be
used to mean military struggle, but the vast majority of Muslims do not consider today’s terrorism to be legitimate, military
jihad.
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Second, the terrorists brand the current governments of many Muslim states as ‘apostate’ – that is as having
turned away from true Islam – on the basis that those states do not conform to the terrorists’ idea of how a
Muslim state should be run. By labelling existing Muslim states in this way, the terrorists believe they can
justify taking violent action against the governments and citizens of those states, even though they are coreligionists.
Third, the terrorists seek to remove what they believe are un-Islamic and alien ‘Western’ influences from the
Muslim world. This approach includes resistance to secular institutions, to certain human rights, and to
Muslim religious practices of which they disapprove.
Fourth, the terrorists argue that Islam itself is facing an active, sustained, and long-term attack from what they
characterise as the Christian and Jewish inspired, but secular, West. This illusion is sustained by characterising
relations between Muslims and Westerners as a long history of injustices and grievances, whilst downplaying
any evidence to the contrary3. These claims are used to justify indiscriminate attacks against ordinary innocent
people.
Taken together, these four elements amount to an intolerant pursuit of narrowly framed beliefs, coupled with
an implacable hostility to the West and its peoples – and to Muslims whose religious practices diverge from
their own – and a rejection of basic human rights and values, backed up by a willingness to commit extreme
violence in pursuit of their aims.
Al Qa’ida, led by Usama Bin Ladin and his deputy Ayman Al Zawahiri, is a radical Islamist terrorist network
that particularly espouses these views.
The threat to the United Kingdom
38. The threat to the UK comes from different quarters. As we saw in the tragic events of 7 July
2005, terrorists inspired by Islamist extremism may come from within British communities –
the bombers were British citizens brought up in this country. However, those charged in
connection with the incidents on 21 July 2005 are of African origin. In recent years, terrorist
suspects investigated in the UK have come originally from countries as diverse as Libya,
Algeria, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Somalia, and elsewhere - as well as those who have lived
most or all of their lives in the UK.
39. The Government assesses that the current threat in the UK from Islamist terrorism is serious
and sustained. British citizens also face the threat of terrorist attacks when abroad. Overall, we
judge that the scale of the threat is potentially still increasing and is not likely to diminish
significantly for some years.
40. The UK has achieved some significant successes in dealing with potential attacks by
Islamist terrorists, since before 2001. A number of credible plans to cause loss of life have been
disrupted; in many cases the individuals involved have either been successfully prosecuted and
imprisoned or are awaiting trial. However, as the tragic attacks of 7 July 2005 have shown, it is
not possible to eliminate completely the threat of terrorist attacks in this country. The rest of
this paper describes what is being done to minimise that risk.
3 This is sometimes referred to as ‘the single narrative’.
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THE RESPONSE
41. Since early 2003, the United Kingdom has been implementing a long-term strategy for
countering international terrorism and the extremism that lies behind it. The aim is:
to reduce the risk from international terrorism,
so that people can go about their daily lives freely and with confidence.
42. To achieve this, the Government has put in place a comprehensive programme of action,
against both short and long term objectives and involving activity both at national and local
level here in the UK and overseas. The strategy and the programme to implement it (known
within Government as CONTEST) are divided into four principal areas:
 preventing terrorism by tackling the radicalisation of individuals;
 pursuing terrorists and those that sponsor them;
 protecting the public, key national services, and UK interests overseas; and
 preparing for the consequences.
43. Taken together these are known as the ‘Four Ps’: PREVENT, PURSUE, PROTECT, and
PREPARE.
Principles
44. The Government believes that respect for international law and human rights standards
must be an integral part of its efforts to counter terrorism. The promotion of good governance
and human rights internationally is also a key element of wider efforts to combat terrorism and
extremism.
45. Similarly, the drive for equality, social inclusion, community cohesion and active
citizenship in Britain strengthens society and its resistance to terrorism here in the UK.
46. Successful delivery of this counter-terrorism strategy depends upon partnerships between
all parts of Government; the public, private, and voluntary sectors; and all of us as individuals
and as members of communities.
PREVENTING TERRORISM BY TACKLING THE RADICALISATION
OF INDIVIDUALS
47. The PREVENT strand of CONTEST is concerned with tackling the radicalisation of
individuals, both in the UK and elsewhere, which sustains the international terrorist threat.
48. The processes whereby certain experiences and events in a person’s life cause them to
become radicalised, to the extent of turning to violence to resolve perceived grievances, are
critical to understanding how terrorist groups recruit new members and sustain support for their
activities. This section of the paper deals with the measures being taken to counter
radicalisation.
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How does radicalisation occur?
Identifying the factors which may lead to radicalisation, and some of the arguments used to justify it, are
important so that we can focus our responses in order to reduce the risk of terrorism. Of course, setting out
these factors does not in any way imply that we accept their validity or that resorting to terrorist violence
could ever be justified.
It is also important to see this as a two stage process. An alienated individual who has become highly
radicalised is not necessarily a terrorist. Only a tiny minority of radicalised individuals actually cross over
to become terrorists: by financing, lending facilities to, or encouraging active terrorists, or by actively
participating in terrorist attacks.
There are a range of potential factors in radicalisation and no single factor predominates. It is likely the
catalyst for any given individual becoming a terrorist will be a combination of different factors particular
to that person.
Potentially radicalising factors include the development of a sense of grievance and injustice. As has
already been noted, the terrorists’ version of history and recent events is highly negative and partial in its
interpretation of past interactions between Islam and the West.
 The process of globalisation, in particular over the past two decades, has had ramifications right
across the world and in many countries the effect has been not just economic, but also political,
social and cultural change on a significant scale. Given the impact on local ways of life, those
already predisposed to be suspicious of the West can seek to portray these changes as a deliberate
attempt to replace traditional structures with Western models, rather than as the consequence, for
good and ill, of modernisation.
 Alongside this is often a simplistic, but virulent anti-Westernism. The presence of Western
interests, and sometimes military forces, in Muslim countries – even though this is at the request
and with the permission of a country’s government – is seen by some as an affront and a source
of shame.
 Also some argue that the West does not apply consistent standards in its international behaviour.
Conflicts such as Bosnia and Chechnya are cited, where Muslims have been the victims of
violence, and it is argued that the Western nations have failed to act quickly or effectively enough
to protect them, ignoring many positive interventions (‘the UK support for Muslims across the
world’ boxes below). In particular, this applies to perceptions of relations with Israel and the
approach to the Middle-East Peace Process, where the UK is actively committed to a two-state
solution, with a viable Palestinian state alongside a secure Israel.
 Specific events – for example, the Coalition action to restore sovereignty in Kuwait, the UN
authorised actions in Afghanistan to remove the Al Qa’ida terrorist organisation and the Taliban
government sponsoring it and then restore stability there, and US and UK action in Iraq to remove
a serious threat to international security and subsequently to promote a democratic and pluralist
government – are sometimes portrayed as attacks on Islam itself, regardless of the actual rationale
for the action. Media coverage of isolated and unacceptable incidents involving Western forces in
Muslim countries, where individuals fail to live up to the standards we have set ourselves in the
treatment of prisoners and civilians, may also be used to convince susceptible individuals that the
West is antipathetic to Islam.
Another potential factor is a sense of personal alienation or community disadvantage, arising from socioeconomic
factors such as discrimination, social exclusion, and lack of opportunity. While an individual
may not be relatively disadvantaged, he or she may identify with others seen as less privileged; also
different generations within the same family may have significantly different views about these issues.
An important factor is exposure to radical ideas. This may come from reading radical literature on Islamic
and other subjects or surfing the Internet (where many types of radical views are strongly promoted), but
more often radicalisation seems to arise from local contacts and from peers. Exposure to a forceful and
inspiring figure, already committed to extremism, can be important here. This person may be associated
with a particular place (e.g. a mosque) or can be a national or international figure, seen on video or heard
on tapes. Inspiration from a distance is important and there is evidence that the rise of the Internet, with its
ability to connect people, to pass ideas between them, and then pass those ideas on to others has had a
significant impact on the accessibility and flow of radical ideas.
None of these factors is conclusive and they are probably best viewed as considerations which may
influence radicalisation.
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Tackling disadvantage and supporting reform
49. The first area of action to counter radicalisation lies in addressing structural problems in
the UK and elsewhere that may contribute to radicalisation. In the UK, this forms part of the
Government’s broader equality agenda and we are working with communities and the public
and private sectors to address these wider issues. Many Government programmes that are not
specifically directed at tackling radicalism nevertheless help to build cohesion in communities
across the country - for example, Sure Start.
Improving Opportunities, Strengthening Society
Many Muslims suffer high levels of disadvantage, and work has been underway for some time on
addressing the inequalities they experience. The Government’s broader race and community cohesion
strategy ‘Improving Opportunities, Strengthening Society’ (IOSS) was published in January 2005 and
outlined a cross-government response to reducing inequalities, particularly those associated with race and
faith, and to increasing community cohesion.
In particular, the strategy includes actions being taken to help Muslims improve their educational
performance, employment opportunities, and housing conditions.
There is now a cross-government steering group that considers the progress made against these initial
indicators, and an annual report on progress against its actions is due to be published in Summer 2006.
The Faith Communities Capacity Building Fund was announced through this initiative in January 2005. Its
purpose is to help faith-based organisations to engage more effectively with the Government, with civil
society, and with other faiths. To date total funding of £7.7 million has been shared between 588
organisations, £1.5million of which went to Muslim organisations.
Commission on Integration and Cohesion
A Commission on Integration and Cohesion was announced in June 2006. It will consider how local areas
themselves can play a role in forging cohesive and resilient communities, by:
 examining the issues that raise tensions between different groups in different areas, and that lead
to segregation and conflict;
 suggesting how local community and political leadership can push further against perceived
barriers to cohesion and integration;
 looking at how local communities themselves can be empowered to tackle extremist ideologies;
and
 developing approaches that build local areas’ own capacity to prevent problems, and ensure they
have the structures in place to recover from periods of tension.
The Commission will report to the Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government and will
publish its findings in June 2007.
Supporting reform and modernisation
We have increased UK and international support for regionally-led reform in the Muslim world. This is
important for many reasons, but will help address the political and socio-economic environment which
extremists exploit. The Foreign and Commonwealth Office’s (FCO) Global Opportunities Fund has
supported over 150 projects in the Middle East and North Africa and 25 programmes in Afghanistan and
other key countries in South and South East Asia and Africa to support the development of effective,
accountable governments, democratic institutions and the promotion of human rights. For example:
 support for civil society anti-corruption initiatives;
 media reform projects across the Middle East;
 prison reform;
 education initiatives and partnerships with madrassas (traditional Islamic educational institutions
that specialise in the transmission of religious education) on reform;
 legal reform (including training of lawyers on international human rights law); and
 exchanges between Christian and Muslim religious teaching institutions.
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The FCO redirected the focus of its scholarship programme to reflect this work. In 2005/6, 119 candidates
from Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC) countries secured scholarships. The FCO also
introduced a new fellowship scheme to offer mid-career professionals the opportunity of an intensive threemonth
course in the UK. In 2005, it welcomed 87 fellows from 43 countries on seven specially tailored
Chevening Fellowship courses under the overall themes of ‘Engaging with the Islamic World’ and
‘International Security and Governance’ at UK universities – including: ‘Islam and Governance’ at the
University of Birmingham, ‘Participation of Women’ at University College London and ‘Government
Relations with NGOs and civil society’ at the University of Glasgow. So far in 2006, 88 fellows have come
on the same seven courses.
More than 30 countries receiving UK development assistance have sizeable Muslim populations. Some of
our largest bilateral development programmes are focussed on predominantly Islamic countries, for
example in 2004/5 we provided £122 million in Bangladesh; £72 million in Afghanistan; and £56 million
in Pakistan. The Department for International Development (DfID) contributes to modernisation through
working on improving governance, including anti-corruption, reform of security services and justice
systems, reform of education systems, and laws on private sector development in order to help create
educational and employment opportunities for disaffected youths.
Deterring those who facilitate terrorism
50. The second area of action to counter radicalisation is by changing the environment in which
the extremists and those radicalising others can operate; deterring those who facilitate terrorism
and those who encourage others to become terrorists.
Legislation
The Terrorism Act 2006 made it a criminal offence directly or indirectly to encourage the commission,
preparation, or instigation of acts of terrorism or to disseminate terrorist publications. This offence includes
statements or publications that glorify terrorism.
The Terrorism Act 2000 made it illegal for certain terrorist groups to operate in the UK and extended
proscription to include international terrorist groups, like Al Qaida. The Terrorism Act 2006 broadened the
basis for proscribing organisations to include those that promote or encourage terrorism.
Unacceptable behaviours
The list of Unacceptable Behaviours published on 24 August 2005 sets out the behaviours likely to lead to
an individual being excluded or deported from the UK. It covers any non-UK citizen who uses any medium,
including:
 writing, producing, publishing or distributing material;
 public speaking including preaching;
 running a website; or
 using a position of responsibility such as teacher, community or youth leader;
to express views which:
 foment, justify or glorify terrorist violence in furtherance of particular beliefs;
 seek to provoke others to terrorist acts;
 foment other serious criminal activity or seek to provoke others to serious criminal acts; or
 foster hatred which might lead to inter-community violence in the UK.
Acting on unacceptable behaviours
Thirty six foreign nationals have been excluded since August last year on all grounds of unacceptable
behaviour. There has been one decision in principle to deport and four other deportation cases on grounds
of unacceptable behaviour are under consideration.
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51. Sometimes particular places can also be sources of radicalising influences. The influence
of particular mosques has already been mentioned (see How does radicalisation occur page
10), but there is also evidence that individuals can become radicalised whilst in prison.
Prisons and radicalisation
In February 2006, the first national training event for HM Prison Service (HMPS) Imams was delivered as
a result of direct intervention and support from the HMPS Police Advisors Section. They identified a need
for specialist training for Imams, in order to support their daily work with all Muslim prisoners, including
those imprisoned for terrorist-related charges. This national training event also led to the establishment of
a partnership between the Police Advisors Section and the HMPS Muslim Adviser.
The Police Advisors Section has encouraged HMPS to develop strategies to identify and combat
radicalisation within the prison population. The officers have been working with HMPS and other Police
and community specialists to establish a unique mentoring programme, which seeks to identify those
Muslim prisoners potentially susceptible to radicalisation or extremist views and which supports them upon
their release from prison to integrate back into their local community.
52. The Government will be working with local communities to identify other areas where
radicalisation may be taking place and to help communities protect themselves and counter the
efforts of extremist radicalisers.
The battle of ideas
53. Speaking on 21 March 2006, the Prime Minister said: “This terrorism will not be defeated
until its ideas, the poison that warps the minds of its adherents, are confronted, head-on, in their
essence, at their core”. The third area of action to counter radicalisation is therefore a battle of
ideas, challenging the ideological motivations that extremists believe justify the use of
violence. In particular, we are working with communities to help them discourage susceptible
individuals from turning towards extremist activity.
Recent engagement with Ministers
 Following the London bombings, the Prime Minister met 25 Muslim community leaders on 19 July
2005. The meeting was to make a united reinforcement of the need to work together to prevent
extremism in our communities.
 The Home Secretary subsequently chaired a meeting on 20 July 2005 with Muslim community
leaders at which it was agreed to establish seven community-led working groups to develop
recommendations for tackling extremism amongst our young people (see below).
 The Ministers for Women held their biannual meeting with representatives of the Muslim Women’s
Network in October 2005 and discussed the role women can play in tackling extremism in Muslim
communities. Membership of the network includes representatives from academia, non-governmental
organisations and grass-roots community groups.
 In November 2005, the Prime Minister attended a discussion group in Leeds of 50 people aged
between 16 and 25 to find out about the challenges facing young British Muslims. As part of more
general discussions about longer-term partnership between government and local communities, they
looked at the way the media report on terrorism and Islam and about ways of finding a communityled
response to extremism.
 In February 2006, Dr Kim Howells met a group of successful and influential young Muslim men and
women in Whitechapel, London and discussed the issues they chose to raise, from education to
foreign policy. He then visited Ebrahim College to meet teachers and pupils of this innovative
institution.
 In May 2006, the Prime Minister and Ruth Kelly hosted an event for 40 Muslim women at Downing
Street, aimed at boosting understanding of the community through meeting a wider range of people
from within it.
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(a) Working with communities
54. The Government has been working with communities for many years to help shape policy
and determine its objectives.
55. The Home Office has supported Muslim and other faith communities and encouraged their
contribution to social cohesion and interfaith activities (work now being taken forward by the
Department of Communities and Local Government). This has included establishing a
Ministerial and Officials visits programme in January 2003 to listen to the concerns of Muslim
communities; working with media organisations to improve perceptions of Muslim
communities; working with the Police on protecting the Muslim community; and consulting
with all faith communities on the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001.
56. Similarly, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) has been working with Muslim
communities on a range of generic and country specific issues. Typical examples include
setting up the British Hajj Delegation (providing consular support to British Hajj pilgrims)
seven years ago, and regular Ministerial involvement in community events, such as Mike
O’Brien’s speech at the inaugural meeting of the Association of London Mosques in 2005.
57. Following the attacks in London last July, Home Office ministers visited nine towns and
cities with large Muslim populations to consult them about how government could work with
communities to prevent extremism. 1,000 British Muslims took part in these consultations and
seven community-led working groups were set up under the banner of ‘Preventing Extremism
Together’ (PET). The working groups produced 64 recommendations: 27 of these were for the
Government to lead on, while the remainder were for communities themselves to work on,
supported by Government where necessary.
58. Progress on the three principal recommendations, where the Government is supporting
communities – a national grassroots-led campaign targeted at Muslim youth (the Scholars’
Roadshow); Muslim Forums on Extremism and Islamophobia, and a Mosques and Imams
National Advisory Board – is outlined below.
PET – Scholars’ Roadshows
A series of national roadshows are taking place, led by British Muslim organisations and supported by
Government. To date 20 influential mainstream Muslim scholars and thinkers have spoken to audiences of
young British Muslims to propagate effective arguments against extremist justification for terrorism and
denounce it as un-Islamic. Up to 30,000 people have attended the first seven of 12 roadshows and we
expect more than 100,000 to attend in total.
PET – Muslim Forums against Extremism and Islamophobia
The creation of six regional forums led by key individuals to bring together members of local Muslim
communities, law enforcement and public service agencies to discuss how to tackle extremism and
Islamophobia in their area. The forums provide a safe space for sharing views and developing new thinking
and action plans for dealing with extremism. The first three forums were held in late June and early July
2006.
PET – Mosques and Imams National Advisory Board
The Mosques and Imams National Advisory Board is an initiative led by Muslim communities, which aims
to provide guidance and support to mosques and imams. A steering group of Muslim leaders has
undertaken an extensive national consultation on matters such as the accreditation of imams, better
governance of mosques, and interfaith activity. The steering group represents all sections of the Muslim
community and published a good practice guide for mosques when the Advisory Board was formally
launched on 27 June 2006.
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59. Action has been agreed on all 27 of the recommendations for the Government. At the time of
writing, action on three of the recommendations had already been completed – consultation on the
Department for Education and Skills (DfES) ‘Youth Matters’ Green Paper; extending Equal
Opportunities legislation to cover discrimination on the grounds of faith; and expanding the Muslim
Ethnic Achievement project to improve the achievement levels of Muslim students. In a further 17
cases the Government has accepted the recommendation and work is in progress to implement it. For
three recommendations the Government is still considering its response; for two more an alternative
outcome has been put in place; and the remaining two recommendations are not being taken forward.
Further information about progress on all the PET recommendations will be made available on the
Department for Communities and Local Government’s website (www.dclg.gov.uk).
60. A key outcome of the PET initiative has been that representatives of many differing views
within the British Muslim communities have worked with Government towards a single goal.
This approach is continuing. Within the PET framework, a cross-government forum has been
established to consider how to tackle extremism on campuses; outside PET, the Government is
working with Muslim communities to improve their approach to tackling extremism – for
example, funding the charity Forward Thinking to run a series of workshops across England
with young Muslims on the role of Islam in a pluralistic society.
(b) Working internationally
61. The Foreign Office is doing more to explain that our foreign policy is based upon striving
for UK interests in a safe, just and prosperous world and to counter extremists’ allegations that
it has an anti-Islamic agenda. This means explaining better the reasons why, for example, we
supported and continue to support action in Iraq and Afghanistan. Many disagreed with the
decisions to take military action in those countries. We respect those views. However, the UK
Government intervened because of wider issues and not because these are Muslim countries.
In fact, in the wider context of British foreign policy, we have done much to help and assist
Muslims all over the world (see below).
UK support for Muslims across the world – general
Over the last five years, bilaterally and through other organisations, the UK Government has provided over
£5.5 billion in international development assistance to much of the Muslim world.
UK support for Muslims across the world – specific
 Kosovo: The UK, as a part of NATO, played a leading role in the intervention in Kosovo, in order to
avert a humanitarian catastrophe not seen in Europe since the Second World War, and has played a
significant role in the subsequent reconstruction programme.
 Pakistan earthquake: The UK has been among the largest bilateral donors to earthquake relief and
reconstruction efforts.
 Turkey: The UK is one of the strongest supporters of Turkey’s EU membership.
 Kashmir: We are fully involved in supporting dialogue between India and Pakistan on the issue of
Kashmir, emphasising that any durable solution must take into account the wishes of the peoples of
Kashmir.
 Palestine: The UK Government is fully committed to a Palestinian state alongside a secure Israel. On
top of our significant financial assistance to the Palestinians, we are focusing international efforts on
helping to develop the institutions necessary for a viable Palestinian state.
 Bosnia: The UK supports the War Crimes Chamber, bringing to justice those who committed crimes
during the wars of the 1990s. The UK has also played a major role in the reconstruction of Bosnia,
with over £20 million in bilateral assistance in the last two years.
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 Darfur, Sudan: The UK is one of the largest bilateral donors in helping the victims of the crisis in
Darfur. We are also fully engaged in support of the peace process.
 Afghanistan: The UK, as part of an international coalition, helped to remove the Taliban regime that
both shielded the Al Qa’ida terrorist organisation and abused the human rights of Afghanistan’s
(Muslim) citizens.
 Iraq: The UK as part of an international coalition helped remove a regime that was a standing threat
to neighbouring countries, and had viciously abused the human rights of its own – mostly Muslim –
citizens.
62.We are also working to counter extremists’ false characterisation of the UK as being a place
where Muslims are oppressed. The Foreign Office and Home Office have, for example,
facilitated a series of visits by delegations of British Muslims to 13 countries and additional
visits are planned. A dedicated team of key language specialists works to explain British
policies and the role of Muslims in British society, in print, visual and electronic media. The
FCO’s network of missions aboard is fully involved in this work.
63. The PREVENT programme is by its nature a long-term commitment, which will take time
to show concrete results.
PURSUING TERRORISTS AND THOSE THAT SPONSOR THEM
64. The PURSUE strand of CONTEST is concerned with reducing the terrorist threat to the
UK and to UK interests overseas by disrupting terrorists and their operations.
Intelligence
65. By their nature, terrorists operate in secret. Intelligence is therefore vital to defeating
terrorism. All disruption operations depend upon the collection and exploitation of information
and intelligence that helps identify terrorist networks, including their membership, intentions,
and means of operation. The Security Service (MI5), the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS), and
the Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) – known collectively as the security
and intelligence agencies – are therefore critical to the work on PURSUE, as is the work of the
police, both special branches and neighbourhood policing alike, for UK-based terrorist
networks.
66. Our understanding of the new terrorist networks continues to improve. Since September
2001 there has seen a significant shift of Government resources into the business of gathering
and analysing information on the threat and configuring departments and agencies in the most
effective way to address it. While we are taking action to build an ever better picture of
extremist activity within the UK, our understanding of the threat still remains inevitably
imperfect.
Taking a joint approach
The Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre, which was created in June 2003, has continued to analyse and assess
all intelligence relating to international terrorism. It continues to attract interest from overseas as an
example of joined-up working in the intelligence field and this approach is being emulated in a number of
other countries.
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67. Public safety is the top priority for the Government, the police, and the intelligence
agencies. The Government fully support the police and Security Service in the difficult
decisions they must make when faced with the current terrorist threat. Operational decisions on
whether and how to conduct counter terrorist operations are a matter for the police. There may
be situations where the police believe they have no choice but to take action on the basis of the
specific intelligence they have received. The difficulties in assessing intelligence about terrorist
activity were highlighted in the Government’s response to the Intelligence and Security
Committee’s Report into the London Terrorist Attacks on 7 July 2005:
“... many pieces of intelligence are received by the [Security and Intelligence] Agencies
on a weekly basis on potential terrorist threats and intentions. Terrorists make great
efforts to ensure that intelligence about their intentions is difficult to obtain and analyse.
Intelligence is generally fragmentary, of varying reliability and difficult to interpret.
Complex and challenging investigative judgements have to be made on the basis of
often incomplete data. There is always a difficult balance to strike between investigating
those known to be a current threat and working to discover other possible threats.”
Disruption
68. Covert operational counter-terrorist activity in the United Kingdom is conducted by the
Security Service in close collaboration with police forces across the country and the Anti-
Terrorist Branch of the Metropolitan Police. The police are responsible for taking executive
action, such as arrests, and conducting the investigation against those suspected of involvement
in terrorism. The SIS and GCHQ, in collaboration with intelligence and security partners
overseas, operate covertly in support of the Security Service to disrupt terrorist threats.
Successful disruptions
The police and the security and intelligence agencies have disrupted many attacks against the UK since
November 2000, including four since last July alone.
69. The Government continues to strengthen its co-ordinated, multi-agency, and international
approach to the disruption of terrorist activity. Prosecution remains the preferred way of
responding to persons involved in terrorist activity, but other options for taking disruptive
action include deportation on grounds of national security or unacceptable behaviour, control
orders under the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005, freezing and seizing financial assets, and
proscription of organisations.
70. There are limits to what we can say about disruption activity. We cannot be publicly explicit
about the detail of many of these operations because of the need to preserve operational security
and our capability to conduct similar operations in the future. In addition, where individuals are
being prosecuted for terrorist offences, the Government obviously cannot discuss specific cases
until the legal processes are complete. Many disruptions of terrorist networks lead to prosecutions
for other, non-terrorist offences – sometimes major offences such as crimes of violence, and
sometimes lesser offences such as fraud – or to actions for deportation, or to impose control orders.
In many cases, these actions must by law remain anonymous, so again they cannot be discussed in
any detail, though regular information is provided to Parliament on the scale of such actions. For
example, the Home Secretary provides a regular quarterly report to Parliament on the exercise of
the control order powers. And there is an independent reviewer (currently Lord Carlile of Berriew
QC) who makes an annual report to Parliament on the operation of the control order powers.
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(a) Prosecution
71. Successful prosecution in the courts, based on gathering the necessary evidence and
apprehending those involved in planning acts of terrorism before they can carry out their
intentions, is of course our preferred way of disrupting terrorist activity.
Terrorism Act 2006
The Terrorism Act 2006 extended the maximum period for which a suspected terrorist could be detained
before being charged with an offence from 14 days to 28 days.
Successful disruptions – prosecution
 Mohammed Ajmal Khan was sentenced to 9 years’ imprisonment on 17 March 2006, including for
conspiracy to provide money or property for use in a terrorist act.
 Abu Hamza was convicted of 11 offences on 7 February 2006, including six counts of solicitation to
murder, and sentenced to 7 years’ imprisonment.
 Andrew Rowe was convicted on 23 September 2005 of two counts of possession of an article for a
terrorist purpose, which included notes on how to use a mortar. He was sentenced to 15 years’
imprisonment.
 Saajid Badat was sentenced to 13 years’ imprisonment on 22 April 2005 for conspiring to destroy an
aircraft using a method similar to that used by Richard Reid (the “shoebomber”).
 Kamel Bourgass was convicted on 13 April 2005 of plotting to manufacture homemade poisons and
explosives with the intention of causing harm. He has been sentenced to 17 years’ imprisonment to
run concurrently with the life sentence already being served for the murder of Detective Constable
Stephen Oake.
 Overall, 62 people were subsequently charged with criminal offences following arrests in 2005 under
the Terrorism Act 2000. In the first three months of 2006, a further seven people have been charged
with criminal offences following arrests under the Act.4
72. Where prosecution is not possible, we make effective use of a number of security measures
designed to make the UK a more hostile environment for terrorists to operate in. The Home
Office and the Police lead on these activities in the UK; HM Treasury lead on asset freezing.
(b) Deportation
73. Where the person concerned is a foreign national, and is a threat to the UK, deportation will
usually be an appropriate means of disrupting terrorist activity. This is important in terms of
ensuring public safety, as well as sending a strong signal that foreign nationals who threaten
our national security cannot expect to be allowed to remain in the UK. Those who are outside
the UK will normally be excluded (see Acting on unacceptable behaviours page 12).
Successful disruptions – deportation
 Since 7 July 2005, 38 foreign nationals have been detained under immigration powers pending
deportation on grounds of national security. One further person who was detained under immigration
powers before 7 July remains in custody awaiting deportation.
 Of these 38, two have been deported to Algeria, four face criminal prosecution, and a further six have
been placed on Control Orders after it was decided there was no realistic prospect of deportation. The
remaining 26 face deportation on grounds of national security, along with the person who had been
detained prior to 7 July (i.e. 27 in total).
 A number of appeals against deportation have recently started to be heard – no determinations have
yet been given.
4 These statistics were provided by the Metropolitan Police Service and are based on the most up-to-date police records. The
figures are subject to adjustment as cases are processed through the criminal justice system.
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74. We have enacted legislation to provide us with additional legal tools to deport and exclude
persons who have participated in terrorism.
Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Act 2006
The Immigration, Asylum, and Nationality Act 2006 introduced a range of additional measures which are
relevant in the counter-terrorism context:
 where an individual is being deported on grounds of national security any appeal before removal
is limited to human rights grounds;
 a good character test for registration as a British citizen;
 a lower threshold for deprivation of British citizenship, enabling deportation action to follow;
 a power to deprive a person of their right of abode (a provision allowing certain Commonwealth
citizens to enter the UK as if they were British citizens); and
 an interpretation of the Refugee Convention to make it clear that people who commit, prepare, or
instigate terrorism, or encourage others to do so, are not entitled to protection as refugees.
Other mechanisms
It is the Government’s policy not to permit individuals from abroad who are suspected of involvement in
terrorist activities to remain in the UK. Deporting a terrorist significantly disrupts the activity of that
network, which is beneficial internationally, as well as removing that immediate source of potential attacks
from the UK. But the Government will not deport someone to a country where he faces a real risk of torture
or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. Therefore we are negotiating agreements with some
countries to ensure that, where someone is deported, we can obtain specific assurances, backed up by
independent monitoring, to enable us to satisfy ourselves that removal is consistent with our obligations
under the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).
The UK has concluded Memoranda of Understanding with three countries (Jordan, Libya and Lebanon) to
facilitate deportation of terrorist suspects in a manner consistent with our obligations under the ECHR.
Monitoring bodies have been appointed in Jordan and Libya; agreement in principle has been reached with
a monitoring body in Lebanon. Negotiations are ongoing with a number of other countries in North Africa
and the Middle East. Separate arrangements are in place for deportations to Algeria.
(c) Control orders
75. The Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005 enables the Secretary of State to make a “nonderogating”
control order against an individual who he has reasonable grounds for suspecting
is involved in terrorism-related activity and where he considers it necessary for the protection
of the public. These measures can be applied to any individual, irrespective of nationality, and
whatever the nature of the terrorist activity. A control order is a last resort measure, to address
the threat from an individual where prosecution is not possible and, in the case of a foreign
national, where it is not possible to deport him or her due to our international human rights
obligations (in particular, where there is a real risk of torture).
76. Control orders are preventative. They place one or more obligations upon an individual in
order to prevent, restrict or disrupt involvement in terrorism-related activity. A range of
obligations can be imposed to address the risk posed by the individual concerned, including a
curfew, restrictions on the use of communication equipment, restrictions on the people that the
individual can associate with, and travel restrictions. The legislation requires that control orders
made by the Secretary of State must be compatible with the individual’s right to liberty under
Article 5 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). Although there is a procedure
in the legislation for Parliament to agree to derogate from Article 5 of the ECHR, so the
Secretary of State can apply to a court to make a “derogating” control order, this has currently
not been exercised.
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77. The 2005 Act contains strong safeguards to protect the rights of the individual, including
requirements for judicial oversight and review of control orders. The legislation and its
operation have recently been challenged in the courts. The High Court ruled on 12 April 2006
that the legislation is incompatible with Article 6 of the ECHR (right to a fair hearing), and
ruled again on 28 June 2006 that the obligations imposed in six specific cases amounted to a
deprivation of liberty under Article 5 of the ECHR. The Government is appealing both
judgements in the Court of Appeal. All existing control orders remain in force (including the
six cases in the second High Court ruling which remain in force pending the outcome of the
appeal), and the Secretary of State will continue to make new control orders where he considers
it necessary to do so.
Successful disruptions – control orders
There are currently 15 control orders made by the Secretary of State in operation. Nine of these are in
respect of foreign nationals; the other six are in respect of British citizens.
(d) Financial controls
78. Whenever terrorists come into contact with the financial system, they can generate vital
clues that can lead to their disruption and apprehension. To maximise the impact of this
financial intelligence, and make it harder for terrorists to operate, the UK’s money laundering
and terrorist finance measures require financial institutions to ‘know their customer’, keep
proper records, and report suspicious activity. Irrespective of any final charges, every terrorist
suspect is subject to financial investigation. Enquiries following the attacks of 7 July and
attempted attacks of 21 July demonstrated the critical role of terrorist finance investigation in
progressing specific enquiries and establishing an enhanced intelligence picture.
(e) Seizing and freezing assets
79. A major challenge for law enforcement is to disrupt terrorists’ ability to raise, move and use
funds. Experience has shown the costs of carrying out bombing incidents to be relatively low
but terrorist networks also need more significant funding to support the rest of their activities,
including recruitment, training and welfare payments to the families of those killed. This is
often achieved through ordinary criminal activity such as identity fraud, cheque fraud and
misuse of charities.
80. Various powers now exist to challenge terrorist fundraising. For example, the UK’s terrorist
asset freezing powers publicly identify suspected individuals and groups linked to terrorism.
These also freeze any existing assets and disable terrorists’ ability to raise or move further
funds.
81. An effective and collaborative partnership between specialist law enforcement officers,
government and the private financial sector in the UK has raised awareness of the
vulnerabilities and has helped develop solutions.
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Successful disruptions - financial
Since 2001, in relation to terrorist cases there have been:
 £400,000 of cash seizures under the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2000;
 £110,000 of forfeited funds;
 £475,000 of funds seized under the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002; and
 £477,000 subject to Treasury asset freezes.
(This does not include the £78 million that was frozen until 2002 as part of UK action against the Taliban.)
82. In accordance with UN Security Council Resolutions, countries are required to freeze the
assets of individuals who are involved with terrorism and stop them receiving payments
directly or indirectly. To ensure that these sanctions do not contravene basic human rights, the
Government is required to make payments under licence to meet basic expenses. The
Government has announced to Parliament that state benefits paid to individuals sharing the
same household with a listed person will only be paid under strict licence conditions, providing
safeguards to ensure funds are not diverted to terrorism.
(f) Proscription
83. The proscription of terrorist organisations also contributes towards making the UK a hostile
environment for terrorists and sends a strong message that the UK totally rejects such
organisations and any claims to legitimacy. Proscription is a tough power as it has the effect of
outlawing previously lawful activity. Once an organisation is proscribed it is a criminal offence
to belong to, support, or display support for a proscribed organisation. The Terrorism Act also
allows the police to seize all property of a proscribed organisation.
Successful disruptions – proscription
 A total of 40 international and 14 domestic terrorist organisations are currently proscribed in the UK.
 The list of proscribed organisations is contained in Schedule 2 to the Terrorism Act 2000 and is
available on the Home Office website (http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk).
 This list was extended by Order in 2005.
Working with communities
84. As recent events have demonstrated, counter terrorist operations can have an impact on
relations between the police and local communities. It is in the interest of everyone – in
particular the police and the affected local community – that these operations are conducted in
the most appropriate and effective manner, and take due account of community relations issues.
85. It is also important that local communities are provided with as much information as
possible in a transparent and open manner. However, this needs to be balanced against
maintaining the integrity of an ongoing counter-terrorist operation (including protecting the
source of any intelligence) as well as legal constraints. Considerable effort is made by the
police at all levels to engage with local communities in such circumstances: through local
partnerships, through regular contact with community representatives informally, and through
mechanisms such as the Muslim Safety Forum (see below).
86. Lessons are continually being learned on all these issues in order to improve the way in
which counter terrorist operations are conducted.
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Muslim Safety Forum
There are monthly Muslim Safety Forum (MSF) meetings, held at New Scotland Yard, to address matters
of concern to the Muslim communities in the UK, mainly, although not exclusively, related to terrorism and
extremism. This is a national meeting, albeit mainly London-based.
It grew out of existing contacts and work with the Muslim Council of Britain, initiated by the police as far
back as 2000, and was eventually formalised as the MSF on 13 September 2001. It is run by the Muslim
members and community representatives themselves, with police attendance from the Metropolitan Police
and the Association of Chief Police Officers; police forces other than the Metropolitan Police attend by
request or invitation.
International dimension
87. Both intelligence gathering and action to disrupt and apprehend terrorists are often carried
out in co-operation with our international partners. To facilitate this, the UK provides training
and other assistance to certain foreign governments, in order to help them build up their ability
to counter terrorism.
Assisting other countries
 In FY05/06, the UK spent over £7.3M helping other nations to build their counter-terrorist
capabilities.
 Over the past year the Ministry of Defence has assisted with counter-terrorist training in more than a
dozen countries.
 Other agencies, such as the Police, have provided counter-terrorism training assistance to officials
from other nations, both in the UK and by deploying trainers overseas.
 The police Counter-Terrorism & Extremism Liaison Officer (CTELO) Scheme has also been
expanded. In addition to close co-operation with our partners in the European Union, CTELOs are
now being posted to Pakistan, Malaysia, and North Africa.
Working with and through international institutions
 A new EU Counter-terrorism Strategy was endorsed by the European Council in December 2005
during the UK’s Presidency.
 The swift extradition from Italy to the United Kingdom of a suspect in the attempted bombings on 21
July demonstrated the effectiveness of the new European Arrest Warrant.
 In the United Nations we are working to ensure the implementation of Security Council Resolution
1373 which creates legal obligations on all states to crack down on terrorists, their supporters and
their sources of finance, as part of an effective UN global counter-terrorism strategy.
PROTECTING THE PUBLIC, KEY NATIONAL SERVICES,AND UK
INTERESTS OVERSEAS
88. The PROTECT strand of CONTEST is concerned with reducing the vulnerability of the UK
and UK interests overseas to a terrorist attack.
89. This covers a range of issues such as borders, the critical national infrastructure, and
crowded places. For security reasons, this paper does not provide any information about the
extent to which there are currently concerns in relation to specific risks or vulnerabilities
relating to any particular sector or area.
90. Following the terrorist attacks in London of 7 July 2005, we have reviewed the UK’s Threat
Level system and how Government and security professionals respond at each level. We are
clear that, in future, the Government should say more publicly about its general analysis of the
terrorist threat and broad approach to protective security. The review has simplified the system
for security practitioners and works to clarify the process for the general public without causing
alarm. The ‘Threat Levels: The System to Assess the Threat from International Terrorism’ paper
published in July 2006 provides more information on these changes.
Borders
91. One strand of this work aims to strengthen the UK’s border security and tracking systems.
The Border Management Programme (BMP) is a cross-government initiative aimed at
developing and implementing closer and more effective joint working in order to strengthen
border security whilst minimising the impact on legitimate traffic.
92. The Strategic Objectives of the Programme are to:
 improve intelligence sharing in support of border operations;
 jointly identify and manage risks;
 provide a more effective border control; and
 minimise the impact on legitimate traffic and business partners.
e-borders
The e-Borders programme will revolutionise our capability to process passengers entering and leaving the
UK by air, rail and sea. The programme will use systems and technology to ensure that we know much
sooner who is entering and leaving and will afford better opportunities to manage the passenger volumes.
Project Semaphore is a pilot scheme that is being used to test elements of e-Borders systems and processes.
Project Semaphore was launched in November 2004 and will be superseded by the full e-Borders system,
which is being rolled out over the period from 2008 to 2014.
Project Semaphore currently captures inbound and some outbound passenger information from 18 air
carriers on selected routes originating from 37 non-UK airports. To date 9 million passenger movements at
an annual rate of 12 million passenger movements have been captured. The passenger information received
is passed through an operations centre staffed by operators from the UK Immigration Service, the Police
Service, UKVisas and HM Revenue and Customs, and checked against various agency watchlists. This
increasing data capture has already provided benefits to the British intelligence community with over 100
‘alerts’ having been issued to them.
Project Semaphore is therefore assisting the intelligence community by:
 increasing the effectiveness of monitoring of travellers moving into, out of or transiting the UK;
 reducing the number of routes available to those not wishing to come to the notice of UK authorities;
 increasing the number of effective interventions against individuals of national security interest;
 increasing intelligence on individuals of national security, immigration or criminal interest; and
 capturing increased quantities of data for post incident or historical analysis.
Biometrics
A programme to implement biometric visas is currently at the stage of contractual negotiations, with the
aim of implementation starting in August 2006.
Radiological threats
Fixed radiation detection equipment is now operational at a number of UK ports and airports screening
traffic entering the United Kingdom for the illicit movement of radioactive materials. Rollout of the
strategic fixed and mobile capabilities across the UK is continuing to take place during 2006-07.
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Critical National Infrastructure
93. Other strands of work aim to reduce the vulnerability to attack of the UK’s Critical National
Infrastructure (CNI) including its transport systems, and of crowded places. Further measures
include protecting UK interests overseas.
94. Risks are assessed and identified through a national process which considers the probability
of the event and especially its impact on the UK. This helps to identify the priorities for
protection, the aim of which is to reduce the vulnerability to and likelihood of a terrorist attack
through proportionate security measures and technological advances.
Working with the Private Sector
95. The contribution of the private sector is crucial in protecting the UK and UK interests
overseas against terrorism. This involves the public sector working closely with key utilities,
such as energy and water, and with key services, such as transport and finance, within a
framework of advice and regulation that aims to help these businesses operate safely.
Working with the energy sector
Electricity, oil, and gas installations and networks are critical to the running of the country, providing the energy
we need to function, including supporting the operation of many other vital services and utilities. There is a longstanding
programme of work designed to ensure the protection of these and other types of critical infrastructure
from terrorist attack. This is carried out in partnership with industry and government, makes use of new
technologies, and covers physical, personnel, and electronic security. This programme is continually adapted to
take account of the changing shape of sector and this work continues, keeping in step with terrorist
methodologies.
Working with the transport sector
We are working with the transport industries to improve further and develop the wide range of measures
available to counter the terrorist threat. For example, screening of people and baggage has traditionally
been a key part of the UK’s air transport security regime. It is essential that we continually update this
approach, taking advantage of new technologies, exploring applicability in new areas, and developing
methods that can be rolled out in response to enhanced threat. To this end, trials of various methods of
screening people and baggage are being conducted on the rail and London Underground networks. The first
trial, carried out on the Heathrow Express platforms at Paddington Station in January to February 2006,
was successful, with the equipment performing well and the process being received positively by the
majority of those members of the public who were requested to take part. New barriers to vehicles are being
tested at some mainline stations.
Advice and assistance
A booklet entitled “Protecting Against Terrorism” has been published, aimed at those responsible for the
safety of others in businesses and other organisations. It contains protective security advice based on the
best practice derived from Government’s experience in advising a variety of organisations on protective
security, including the Critical National Infrastructure. It is a joint effort by the Security Service, Home
Office, Cabinet Office, and Association of Chief Police Officers, supported by London First and the
Confederation of British Industry (CBI).
The National Security Advice Centre (NSAC) provides advice to Government and the Critical National
Infrastructure (CNI) sectors on the protection of physical assets and on personnel security. It makes
information available via the MI5 website. The National Infrastructure Security Coordination Centre
(NISCC) provides advice on the protection of critical information networks from electronic attack. NISCC
has its own website (www.niscc.gov.uk).
Travel advice
The FCO issues travel advice notices for 217 countries and overseas territories. Each travel advice notice
includes a section on the threat of terrorism. This allows British travellers and expatriates to have up to date
information on which to base their decisions about travel. Travel advice needs to strike a balance between
danger and disruption: making public safety its prime concern whilst seeking to minimise the disruption
that terrorists seek to cause. In cases where the terrorist threat is sufficiently specific, large-scale or
endemic to affect British nationals severely, the FCO will advise against travel.
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PREPARING FOR THE CONSEQUENCES
96. The PREPARE strand of CONTEST is concerned with ensuring that the UK is as ready as
it can be for the consequences of a terrorist attack.
97. Achieving this involves developing the resilience of the UK to withstand such attacks. This
means improving the ability of the UK to respond effectively to the direct harm caused by a
terrorist attack, and in particular to those individuals affected by it; to recover quickly those
essential services which are disrupted by an attack; and to absorb and minimise wider indirect
disruption. We will measure our success by whether we reduce the impact of terrorist attacks
on British citizens and our way of life.
98. A very large number of stakeholders deliver resilience, across the public, private and
voluntary sectors. It is important that all organisations pull in the same direction if contingency
planning is not to be disjointed and inefficient, and if the response to an emergency is to be as
effective as possible. The provision of leadership and direction to the resilience community, and
processes which join-up work at the local, regional and national levels of government, and
between the public, private and voluntary sectors, is thus of fundamental importance to the
PREPARE strand.
99. The key elements of PREPARE are: identifying the potential risks the UK faces from
terrorism and assessing their impact; building the capabilities to respond to them; and regularly
and honestly evaluating and testing our preparedness, including through identifying lessons
from exercises and real-life events.
Identifying and Assessing risks
The Civil Contingencies Secretariat in the Cabinet Office was created in July 2001 to work with a range of
organisations to assess the consequences for the UK of potential emergencies, whether caused by terrorism
or other factors. This risk assessment process, which looks over a five year period, forms the basis for
decisions about emergency preparedness, including investment decisions.
The aim is for organisations at every level to follow this process. A wide range of organisations are involved
and this work, for the first time, forms a systematic and all-inclusive approach to risk analysis which is
reflected across the UK, at national, regional and local levels. In particular at the local level, the conduct
and publication of local risk assessments are now formal duties under the Civil Contingencies Act (see box
on page 26).
100. Given the vast range of potential terrorist attack scenarios, with a wide range of potential
consequences, it is neither practicable nor prudent to plan for every scenario. Instead, planning
seeks to build generic capabilities and plans, able to be drawn on flexibly in the response to a
wide range of terrorist (and other) events.
Building capabilities
The cross-government Capabilities Programme, managed by the Civil Contingencies Secretariat, is the
core framework through which the Government is seeking to build resilience across all parts of the United
Kingdom.
The Programme consists of 17 capability ‘workstreams’ which fall into three groups:
 Three workstreams which are essentially structural, dealing respectively with national, regional
and local response capabilities;
 Five which are concerned with the maintenance of essential services (i.e. food and water, health,
utilities, transport, and financial services); and
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 Nine functional workstreams, dealing respectively with the resilience of the response to chemical,
biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) attacks; management of human infectious diseases;
management of animal and plant infectious diseases; handling mass casualties; management of
mass fatalities; evacuation and shelter capabilities; site clearance capability; warning and
informing the public; and responding to flood emergencies.
Substantial investment has been made to ensure that the emergency services, local authorities and
government departments and agencies are prepared to respond effectively to any emergency. For example:
 Over 7,000 police officers are already CBRN trained, and more are being trained. Over £200
million is being provided under the New Dimensions Programme for mass decontamination,
urban search and rescue and high-volume pumping capability. 80 new Fire and Rescue Service
Incident Response Units are now operationally available each containing equipment capable of
decontaminating up to 400 people an hour.
 Following the attacks of 11 September 2001, the Department of Health established a national
stockpile of medical countermeasures. Antibiotics, antidotes, respiratory support and specialist
equipment are stored in ‘Pods’ strategically placed around the UK. These pods are accessible by
the NHS on a 24-hour basis for rapid deployment in the event of a mass casualty incident.
 Resources are held at national level to fill gaps and enhance the capability of local responders to
manage mass fatality incidents including temporary demountable structures for body storage and
stockpiles of general mortuary equipment. A National Disaster Victim Identification Team has
been created to provide police and forensic personnel who have been trained in emergency
management.
 Regional resilience teams are in place in each Regional Government Office. Multi-agency
Regional Resilience Forums have been convened in each English region to co-ordinate wide-area
planning and to act as a bridge between central Government and the local response.
Civil Contingencies Act 2004
The Civil Contingencies Act 2004 has established a modern framework for civil protection capable of
meeting the challenges of the 21st century. The Act and supporting regulations and guidance have:
 created a common framework of duties for all organisations that are at the core of emergency
planning and response work;
 given local responders a clear set of roles, responsibilities and standards to guide their work;
 mandated structures and processes for partnership working at the local and regional level, and
advocated much greater multi-agency integration and collaboration;
 required emergency planning arrangements to be underpinned by systematic assessments of risk
and exercised regularly;
 mandated business continuity planning to ensure that local responders can sustain the
effectiveness of their functions even in the face of an emergency, and continue to deliver core
functions with a minimum of disruption; and
 conferred a duty to raise awareness of emergency management issues in the communities they
serve.
The bulk of the duties in the Act came fully into force in November 2005. The Act and significant new
investment at a local level in the last spending review (including a doubling of local authority funding) are
already giving new direction and impetus to emergency preparedness work at the local level.
Business Continuity Management
We aim to ensure that organisations at every level of the UK and in every sector who have a role in the
response to or recovery from a major emergency, or whose actions will be important in absorbing and
minimising its indirect impact, have effective business continuity arrangements.
The recently expanded Preparing for Emergencies website (www.pfe.gov.uk) provides a ‘single portal’ for
advice to business and the voluntary sector on emergencies, business continuity and other issues.
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“Preparing for Emergencies – What you need to know”
In 2004 the Government published a booklet providing general advice for a range of emergencies.
“Preparing for Emergencies – What you need to know” was delivered to over 25 million households
throughout the UK. The booklet aimed to ensure that people across the UK had practical, common sense
information about how to prepare for and what to do in the event of an emergency. The booklet is also
available on www.pfe.gov.uk.
101. Finally, we need rigorously and honestly to assess our preparedness to ensure we keep
pace with the developing risks and enhance where necessary our capabilities to match them.
Evaluating & testing resilience
The UK’s ability to respond to a terrorist incident is practised regularly (as are our arrangements for
responding to a wide range of other emergencies).
As part of this framework the Home Office has, for a number of years, sponsored a National Programme
of Counter-Terrorist exercises in conjunction with UK police forces, which are designed to look
specifically at the response to terrorist incidents at local, regional, and national levels, up to and including
the Government central crisis management (“COBR”) mechanisms. The CT exercise programme involves
both live operational and table-top exercises.
Almost all elements of the response to the events of 7 July 2005 had been the subject of exercise activity
in the previous two years in either live or table top format. Such activity included exercise OSIRIS II, which
was held at Bank Underground Station in September 2003, the CAPITAL series of tabletop and command
post exercises which focused on the co-ordination of the emergency response across London, and the
international counter-terrorist exercise ATLANTIC BLUE held jointly with the USA and Canada, which
took place in April 2005, with the UK elements focusing on London.
The importance of this programme of regular exercises, which test capability and drive improvements, was
shown on 7 July 2005, when relevant components of emergency plans developed and tested in recent
exercises were put into effect and worked well.
Reassuring communities
102. One of the terrorist’s aims is to create suspicion and division between communities. We
have therefore put in place measures to monitor the reaction of communities to incidents and
assess the risks to vulnerable sections. This involves the police, other public agencies and
community leaders working together. Interfaith networks, as well as wider civic society,
demonstrated after the events of 7 July 2005 that they would not allow extremists to divide
them.
BROADER ISSUES
Resources
103. The Government considers investment in counter-terrorism and resilience to be a priority
and this has been reflected in the resources which have been made available both to respond to
terrorist events – for example, £775m was made available following the 9/11 attacks – and in
support of the delivery of the counter-terrorism strategy.
104. As our knowledge of the effectiveness of counter-terrorism capabilities has increased, and
as new threats and opportunities have emerged, the Government has allocated further resources
to this area to enable increased capacity. For example, the 2005 Pre Budget Report announced
an additional £85m to enable new capabilities to be developed and accelerate delivery of
existing plans. Final decisions on how this money is allocated lies with departments. By 2008,
annual spending on counter-terrorism, intelligence, and resilience will reach £2bn, which is
double what it was prior to 9/11.
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105. As part of the 2007 Comprehensive Spending Review, the Government will review its
counter-terrorism and security plans and expenditure.
Additional resources for counter-terrorism
The Security Service (MI5) is in the process of doubling the size of its counter-terrorism capability. This
includes strengthening its partnership with the police by opening offices in key regions outside London.
Police forces across the UK are being given additional funding to increase CT capabilities including special
branch coverage of terrorist suspects, and specialist investigation capabilities.
Additional resources for resilience
The Government has more than doubled its contribution to local authorities’ resilience activities, to £40.7m
p.a. for each of the years covered by the Spending Review 2004. This 113% increase was strongly
welcomed by the Local Government Association.

Counter-terrorism strategy

http://security.homeoffice.gov.uk/counter-terrorism-strategy/about-the-strategy/

About the counter-terrorism strategy

The key aim of the counter-terrorism strategy is to reduce the risk from international terrorism so that people can go about their business freely and with confidence.

Who is involved?

Developing and delivering the Government's counter-terrorism strategy involves stakeholders from across government departments, the emergency services, voluntary organisations, the business sector and partners from across the world. Read more about working with partners.

What is the strategy based on?

Since early 2003, the United Kingdom has had a long-term strategy for countering international terrorism (known within Government as CONTEST). Its aim is to reduce the risk from international terrorism, so that people can go about their daily lives freely and with confidence. The strategy is divided into four principal strands: Prevent, Pursue, Protect and Prepare.

Prevent

The Prevent strand is concerned with tackling the radicalisation of individuals, both in the UK and elsewhere, which sustains the international terrorist threat. The Government seek to do this by:

• tackling disadvantage and supporting reform by addressing structural problems in the UK and overseas that may contribute to radicalisation, such as inequalities and discrimination
• deterring those who facilitate terrorism and those who encourage others to become terrorists by changing the environment in which the extremists and those radicalising others can operate
• engaging in the battle of ideas by challenging the ideologies that extremists believe can justify the use of violence, primarily by helping Muslims who wish to dispute these ideas to do so

Pursue

The Pursue strand is concerned with reducing the terrorist threat to the UK and to UK interests overseas by disrupting terrorists and their operations. It has a number of aspects:

• gathering intelligence and improving our ability to identify and understand the terrorist threat
• disrupting terrorist activity and taking action to frustrate terrorist attacks and to bring terrorists to justice through prosecution and other means, including strengthening the legal framework against terrorism
• international co-operation by working with partners and allies overseas to strengthen our intelligence effort and achieve disruption of terrorists outside the UK

Protect

The Protect strand is concerned with reducing the vulnerability of the UK and UK interests overseas to a terrorist attack. This covers a range of issues including:

• strengthening border security, so that terrorists and those who inspire them can be prevented from travelling here and we can get better intelligence about suspects who travel, including improving our identity management
• protecting key utilities by working with the private sector
• transport; reducing the risk and impact of attacks through security and technological advances
• crowded places; protecting people going about their daily lives

Prepare

The Prepare strand is concerned with ensuring that the UK is as ready as it can be for the consequences of a terrorist attack. The key elements are:

• identifying the potential risks the UK faces from terrorism and assessing their impact
• building the necessary capabilities to respond to attacks
• continually evaluating and testing our preparedness, including through identifying lessons from exercises and real-life events